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Fintech and International
Financial Regulation
Yesha Yadav*
ABSTRACT

This Article shows that fintech exacerbates the difficulties of
standard setting in international financial regulation. Earlier work

introduced the "InnovationTrilemma"(the Trilemrma). When seeking to
balance the goals of achieving market integrity and innovation through
clearand simple rulemaking, regulatorscan-at best-achieve only two
out of these three objectives. Fintech's unique characteristics-areliance
on automation and artificialintelligence, novel types of big data, as well
as the use of disintermediatingfinancial supply chains comprising a

mix of traditional firms as well as technology specialists and
newcomers-complicates the applicationof the Trilemma. Rulemaking
struggles to achieve needed clarity where innovative algorithms

introduce informational uncertainties and complex risks for market
integrity. Further, regulation's ability to impose compliance costs on

firms in response to these risks is limited when a preference for
innovation favors smaller upstarts and nontraditionalplayers.
Internationalfinancial regulationpresents even steeper challenges
when viewed through the lens of the Trilemma. First, rules clarity is
harder to achieve owing to divergences in national legal systems,

administrative processes, and market structures. Secondly, fintech
increases negotiation costs in internationalstandard setting owing to
the emergence of a much more expansive cast of economies-like China
and India-that dominate as fintech hubs alongside the traditional
power players such as the United States or European Union (EU). With

distinctive policy preferences, emerging economies constitute powerful
voices that mean that negotiation must account for a wider range of
distributive preferences. Finally, standard setting must bridge the
particularities of domestic market structures that are experiencing
varying degrees of disintermediationand transformationsin financial

supply chains. Rules that impose high compliance costs may be
acceptable to economies dominated by traditional intermediaries but

Professor of Law and Chancellor Faculty Fellow, Vanderbilt Law School. This
Article's preparation and writing has been aided extensively by Professor Chris
Brummer. It is based on and develops ideas set forth in our co-authored article,
Innovation and the Fintech Trilemma, 107 CEo. L.J. 235 (2019).
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may lack buy-in from those where nonbank firms hold sway. In
concluding, this Article briefly surveys strategiesfor fostering greater
global cooperation in standardsetting for fintech.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2019, Facebook revealed its ambition to become
a global monetary superpower by proposing to launch its own digital

currency-Libra.I Boasting almost three billion users worldwideoffering a ready-made network for the future launch of such a projectthe social media behemoth offered prospective customers the prospect
of a new payment system that, if fully realized, could rival the most
dominant national currency systems anywhere within the global

order.2

An Introduction to Libra, LIBRA 1 (June 2019), https:I/libra.org/en-US/wp1.
content/uploads/sites/23/2019/06/LibraWhitePaper enUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST3Z5QUY] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); Hannah Murphy, Facebook Unveils Global Digital Coin
called Libra, FIN. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/afebid48-90cc11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271 [https://perma.cc/U2PR-V2HX] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
2.
Brendan Greeley, Facebook's Libra Currency is Wake-up Call for Central
Banks, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.ft com/content/6960c7a4f3 13-11e9-b018-
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The white paper outlining Libra was more aspirational than real,
touting its future potential to reach a global population of users and
transform how they move their money. Yet in setting out its intent to
reshape global financial markets, Facebook quickly attracted
3
regulatory scrutiny, popular distrust, and political ire. Yet amid this
firestorm, policymakers began to appreciate the full power of digital
financial technologies to revolutionize market structure and to set a
series of questions that national regulators would have to tackle
jointly: Could a tech company successfully manage a currency? What
kinds of risks would Libra's institutional arrangements create for
Libra's users? Did regulators possess the resources to oversee a project
of this scale and significance? Perhaps most fundamentally did
Facebook's idea threaten the future of domestic fiat currencies, and by
extension, the monetary sovereignty of countries animating the global
community? 4
Yet despite the attention garnered by Libra, Facebook's entry into
financial services ultimately comprised the tip of a much larger
iceberg. 5 Over the last few years, markets have witnessed a slate of

3ef8794b17c6 [https://perma.ce/LV58-2EX3] (archived Feb. 18, 2020); Dirk Zetzsche et
al., Regulating LIBRA: The Transformative Potentialof Facebook's Cryptocurrency and
Possible Regulatory Responses 1 (Univ. of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research, Working
Paper No. 042, 2020).
See Eric Posner, The Trouble Starts If Facebook's New Currency Succeeds,
3.
ATLANTIc (June 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/dont[https://perma.cc/F82M-2HXM]
trust-libra-facebooks-new-cryptocurrency/592450/
(archived Apr. 6, 2020); Ben Walsh, Facebook's New Libra Currency Runs Into Distrust
in the Senate, BARRON'S (July 16, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/facebooks1ibra-cryptocurrency-encounters-distrust-in-the-senate -51563300923
[https://perma.cc/2GQJ-JP9U] (archived Apr. 6, 2020).
99 Problems- Examining Facebook'sProposed Cryptocurrencyand Its Impact
4.
on Consumers, Investors, and the American Financial System: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 1-2 (2018) (statement of Chris Brummer, Professor
Ctr.),
Law
Univ.
Georgetown
Law,
of
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-baOO-wstate-brummere20190717.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK9R-WWXW] (archived Feb. 17, 2020); Chris Giancarlo
& Daniel Corfine, We Sent a Man to the Moon. We Can Send the Dollar to Cyberspace,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-sent-a-man-to-the-moon[https://perma.cc/HD9U-ST4N]
we-can-send-the-dollar-to-cyberspace-11571179923
(archived Feb. 18, 2020); Greeley, supra note 2.
The definitions of what constitutes fintech can vary between commentators.
5.
See, e.g., Christophe Williams, What is Fintech?, WHARTON FINTECH (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.whartonfintech.org/blog-archive/2016/2/16/what-is-fintech
[https://perma.cc/CCV9-SKL5] (archived Feb. 7, 2020) (describing fintech as "an
economic industry composed of companies that use technology to make financial systems
more efficient"); Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Eng. & Chair of the Fin. Stability
Bd., The Promise of FinTech-Something New Under the Sun?, Speech at the G20
Conference on "Digitizing Finance, Financial Inclusion and Financial Literacy" (Jan. 25,
2017) (noting the significance of disintermediation as a feature of fintech). For further
discussion, see Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis
Paradigm?1 (Univ. H.K. Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 2015/047, 2016); Dirk A.
Zetzsche et al. From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven
Finance 1 (Eur. Banking Inst., Working Paper No. 6, 2017) (highlighting the role of big
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technological innovation across industries, promising to revolutionize
how financial services are delivered. From innovations like Bitcoin to
online-only lenders, digital wallet providers, or peer-to-peer payments
technologies (like Venmo), technological flourishing in finance has
exposed regulators to complex ideas and inquiries on the significance
of these innovations for existing modalities in regulation.6
Still a central inquiry turns on the determination of what, if
anything, about this wave of financial innovation is really new. After
all, markets have always evolved, invented, and come up with creative
propositions that change how finance works. From the automated
teller machine (ATM) to the financial engineering seen in the run-up
to the 2008 Crisis, innovation has shaped and then reshaped markets
through the ages.7 This truism suggests that if fintech represents just
another iteration of innovation, regulators should be able to rely on
existing tools and strategies for oversight. From the standpoint of
international financial regulation, a lack of newness means that
regulators can look to the mechanisms established by the post-2008
international regulatory framework to promulgate standards for
fintech (if these are really needed) and to motivate compliance from
countries.8 Following the Crisis, this post-2008 regulatory ordercomprising standard-setting bodies as well as enforcers like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)-has shown great success at
leading an overhaul of the global financial system in response to the

lessons learned.
This Article underscores, however, that fintech is different and
that it poses a new regulatory conundrum for policymakers. Earlier
work has highlighted features of fintech that distinguish it from earlier
eras of financial innovation, including: (i) its reliance on automation
and artificially intelligent algorithms; (ii) the pervasive use of big data,
including categories of data (e.g., social media use) that are entirely
unique to the digital age; and (iii) the proliferation of nontraditional
firms, start-ups, and newcomers specializing in tech rather than just
financial
expertise
and
disintermediating
common
financial

functions. 9
This earlier work also introduced the "Innovation Trilemma" (or
the Trilemma): that is, in modeling the trade-offs facing regulators
when overseeing innovation, protecting market integrity, and
legislating through clear and simple rules, regulators can-at best-

data in fintech). In Part II, infra, we define what we consider to be the major features of
fintech: (i) reliance on algorithms; (ii) big data; and (iii) disintermediation in financial
supply chains as well as reliance on non-traditional firms in financial markets).
6.
See discussion and sources in Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and
the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEo. L.J. 235, 237-42 (2019).
7.
See id. at 244-58.
8.
On the international financial regulatory order, see infra Part I.
9.
See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 264-81.
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achieve

only two

out

of these

three objectives.1 0
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For example,

regulators can encourage innovation through clear and simple rules
such as expansive permissions to conduct novel (risky) activities. Such
actions, while likely to nurture new products and services, can
jeopardize market integrity. Similarly, policymakers wishing to
safeguard the market through simple rules, such as outright bans on
certain activities, will discourage innovation. Finally, when looking to
promote innovation while also ensuring market integrity, regulators
can likely only succeed through a complex set of rules."
The application of the Trilemma to fintech represents an
especially challenging task. Artificially intelligent algorithms generate
deep information asymmetries, creating a high analytical burden for
regulators looking to understand how these programs will operate in
real-world markets.1 2 The informativeness of big data remains partial
in some contexts, especially for new types of digital data that lack a
13
Although regulators have faced similar
history of use and testing.
difficulties in the past (e.g., to understand the complex financial
modeling), fintech creates a special challenge. Whereas policymakers
have long been used to overseeing a cadre of familiar Wall Street firms,
usually well resourced and experienced, fintech has opened the door to
and tech experts that compete with
start-ups, newcomers,
incumbents.' 4 As a consequence, regulators face the bind that
imposing compliance costs on these new entrants can drive them out
of finance.15 However, leaving them to create risks for a highly
regulated industry may well imperil the financial system as a whole.16
This Article makes three points. First, the trade-offs laid out in
the Trilemma have outsized implications for global regulators relative

to those acting only within domestic legal systems. Rules clarity in
international standard setting is particularly difficult to achieve owing
to differences between national legal systems, civil and common law
jurisprudence, as well as divergences across administrative and
legislative processes. Similarly, costs to market integrity from crossborder fintech can be harder to estimate in light of these domestic
differences that govern how international standards are implemented
and enforced within home borders. Inadequate home-state regulation
of innovative fintech can have spillover effects into host-state markets,
and local regulators can struggle to sanction bad actors situated

beyond their jurisdiction and expertise. Owing to the difficulty of

Id. at 244.
See id. at 244-49.
Id. at 264-74.
12.
Id.
13.
14.
Id. at 275-78.
15. Id.
See generally William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167
16.
(2018) (arguing that the financial regulatory reforms following the 2008 economic crisis
fail to take into account the quickly changing face of financial services).
10.

11.
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protecting market integrity through clear and simple rulemaking, the
objective of fostering global innovation becomes especially impacted
where fintech aims to reach across national borders to capture scale,
data, efficiencies, and network effects.

Secondly, achieving cross-border consensus on fintech regulation
entails high negotiation costs compared to more traditional fields of
finance owing to a more heterogenous set of principals wielding
influence and power. Boasting successful and influential innovation
hubs, fintech is driven as much by emerging economies like Kenya,

India, and China as by the usual grouping of developed economies that
have long dominated regulatory agenda setting in areas such as
banking, securities, or derivatives regulation. 17 With eye-catching
transaction volumes, widespread adoption of new technologies, and a
younger population of digitally savvy consumers, a number of
emerging economies are leading the way in transposing innovative
fintech into their financial markets. 18 In China, for example, WePaythe mobile payments app-has achieved a monthly user base of around
900 million people. 1 9 A larger and more varied set of actors increases
the negotiation costs involved in crafting a regulatory agenda that
matches each of their particular policy preferences and market
demands. For a number of economies, fintech products have grown to
fill consumer needs that have not otherwise been met by conventional
legacy products like bank accounts or credit cards. 2 0 In developing new

technologies

that large population centers depend on, emerging

economies constitute power centers that bring a complicated set of
distributive costs and trade-offs to standard-setting negotiations.
Finally, the Article shows that international financial regulation
for fintech requires creating standards capable of bridging national
market structures that are variously experiencing disintermediation
and increasing complexity within financial supply chains. As described
in earlier work, fintech is characterized by a more crowded cast of
industry players that comprise the traditional vanguard of Wall Street
firms alongside newer upstarts and technology providers. 2i In some

17.
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION 15-42 (2004) (showcasing the significance of the United States

&

and Japan in driving the creation of the Basel Accords on bank regulation to reflect the
policy dynamics and preferences of these countries) See also KEES CAIMFFERMAN
STEPHEN A. ZEFF, FINANcIAL REPORTING AND GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: A HISTORY OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, 1973-2000, at 295 (2007)
(noting the essential role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the rise of
International Organization of Securities Commissions, or IOSCO).
18.
Jon Frost et al., BigTech and the Changing Structure of Financial
Intermediation 11 (Bank for Int'l Settlements Working Paper No. 779, 2019),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work779.pdf [https:Hperma.c/G5D4-UPMP] (archived Feb. 17,
2020).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 264-81.

2020]

FINTECHAND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

1115

cases, such as for payment networks like Kenya's M-Pesa or China's
WePay, fintech firms can entirely displace the intermediation usually
22
In other
provided by more traditional financial firms like banks.
the
lengthen
can
to
and
add
fintechs
economies and contexts, however,
offer
to
players
legacy
alongside
working
by
financial supply chain
discrete services such as a digital wallet or encryption as add-ons to
bank or investment accounts.23 The varying structural composition of
national financial market structures-undergoing diverging levels of
disintermediation and changes to their financial supply chains-

amplifies the difficulties of rulemaking. Strict, high-compliance rules
to safeguard market integrity may work for economies dominanted by
the traditional financial firm. However, they will likely falter in those
dominated by less traditional and likely less well-capitalized and
regulated entities. Achieving consensus to bridge emerging structural
divergences in market structure thus represents a tall order for even
skilled and highly technocratic international standard setters.
In concluding, this Article briefly outlines initial ideas to help

navigate the new challenges posed by fintech in international financial
regulation. It points to the potential of minilateralism as well as
private self-regulation as offering pathways forward. Recalibrating
international financial regulation for digital fintech can help ensure
that it remains as resonant for the coming decade as much as it has
been for the one just passed. This Article proceeds as follows. Part II
provides an overview of the framework for international financial
regulation. Part III explains the rise of fintech and describes the
Innovation Trilemma, with Part IV analyzing the new landscape faced
by international regulators to tackle the risks of cross-border digital
innovation. Part V concludes with brief ideas for future reform.

II. THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
International financial regulation has experienced impressive
24
Guided by the
successes in the decade following the 2008 Crisis.
Pittsburgh Declaration, global regulators have worked in lockstep to
develop a body of legislative and institutional fixes to overhaul the
financial system and remedy the major weaknesses exposed by the

Frost et al., supra note 18, at 11.
22.
See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 264-81.
23.
24.
See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: How TRADE ALLIANCES,
SOF'T LAW, AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
(2014) [hereinafter BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM] (noting the central place of regional
regulatory alliances); CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012). But see Pierre Hugues-Verdier, The Political
Economy of InternationalFinancial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405 (2013) (noting the
drawbacks of the system of informal international financial regulation).
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2008 financial collapse 2 5 Rarified technocratic bodies-such as the
Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), and the International Organization of Securities
Commissioners (IOSCO)-have crafted detailed standards that have
been implemented into domestic legal systems across the G-20
economies. 2 6 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) have bolstered these efforts by assessing national regulatory
frameworks

international

to

benchmark

standards.2 7

their

This

compliance

informal

with

framework

agreed-upon

of

global

legislative bodies (like the BCBS), combined with the enforcement of
their work products by the IMF and World Bank, have conferred a hard
edge to the otherwise soft nature of international financial
regulation. 2 8 Reflecting the resulting power of this framework,
domestic financial systems around the world have been reformed
wholesale. In the United States, for example, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (the Dodd-Frank
Act) showcased the implementation of international standard setting,

25.
See generally Leader's Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, EUROPEAN
COMM'N
9
(Sept.
24-25,
2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/conmission_20102014/president/pdf/statement_20090826_en_2.pdf
[https://perma.c/6GES-SGQN]
(archived Feb. 17, 2020). This is not to suggest that countries have not diverged in their
implementation of international standards, nor that regulators have always agreed on
implementation strategies and enforcement approaches. See, e.g., Report on the Danger
of Divergence: TransatlanticFinancialReform & the G20 Agenda, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
29-31
(2013)
https://www.atlanticouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/Dangerof DivergenceTransatlantic_Financial_Reform 122.pdf [https://perma.c/JAG5-TUVA] (archived Feb. 17, 2020) [hereinafter ATLANTIC
COUNCIL]; Joe Rennison, U.S. Superior to Europe on Futures Margin, FIN. TIMES (May
14, 2015) [https://perma.cc/CQ2E-2HG4] (archived Feb. 18, 2020).
26.
See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (2012); INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 4 (2011); Basel II: International Regulatory
Framework
for
Banks,
BANK
FOR
INT'L
SETTLEMENTS,
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YPQ6855X] (archived Feb.
17, 2020); Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems, Principlesfor financial market infrastructures,BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS
(Apr. 2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d0l1a.pdf [https://perma.c/L6SG-M7AN]
(archived Feb. 6, 2020).
27.
IMF Staff, Financial Sector Assessment Program, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/1.6/14/Financial-SectorAssessment-Program (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/CVG7-MPG7]
(archived Feb. 17, 2020).
28.
See generally Chris Brummer, How InternationalLaw Works (and How It
Doesn't), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 262-65 (2011) (setting out the foundations of international
financial law and the mechanisms that help harden its soft character) [hereinafter
Brummer, How International Law Works]; David Zaring, Financial Reform's
Internationalism, 65 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1256-62 (2016) (noting the increasing
internationalization of financial regulation and its impact on traditional domestic
administrative process and the role of Congress); BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM, supra
note 24, at 63-120 (discussing the architecture of international finance law).

2020]

FINTECHAND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

1117

producing a far-reaching program of reform that has transformed
domestic regulation in just a handful of years.29
The surging popularity of fintech, however, sets a new and
intractable challenge for this global regulatory order. How effectively
it rises to meet it will, in part, determine its continuing viability for the
decade ahead. This Part sets out a short primer on the international
financial regulatory framework, particularly over the last decade as
30
post-Crisis rulemaking has more fully institutionalized its workings.
In setting out its key features, this Part makes the case that the
complexities of fintech create a serious challenge for regulators,
straining the capacity of the current international financial regulatory
system to serve as a workable coordination and consensus-building
mechanism going forward.
A. The Need for InternationalFinancialRegulation

The cross-border economic carnage triggered by the 2008 Crisis,
followed by the global fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, serve as
abject lessons on the need for a robust international regulatory order
for finance. Owing to gradually loosening controls, capital no longer
remains fixed within the borders of a single country. Rather, facilitated
by dense networks of cross-border bank branches and subsidiaries, it
can move fluidly and rapidly across the globe. Electronic fund transfers
permit these movements to occur digitally, rather than requiring the
31
slow and costly handover of cash and paper documents.
Scholars have pointed to thickening financial linkages between
countries in the decades preceding the Crisis as evidence of growing

cross-border economic interdependencies. Rene Stulz observed that
foreign investors trading in US securities increased from 5.8 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1977 to 344.2 percent by 2003.32 In
2009, US investors bought around $4 trillion in foreign stocks, up from
a relatively meager $51.7 billion in 1986.33 Between 1986 and 2009,
US investors grew their purchases of private debt securities from

$169.8 billion to almost $2 trillion.3 4 Similarly in banking, the rise of

29.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, tit. VII (codified as amended in sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). In
the European Union, see Commission Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (EU).
30.
Brummer, How International Law Works, supra note 28, at 259-61
(describing the "dizzying array" of international rulemaking in response to the 2008
Crisis).
31.
Id. at 265-66.
32. HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONs,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 18-19 (18th ed. 2011); Rene Stulz, The Limits of Financial
Globalization7-8, 54 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11070, 2005),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w11070.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T3S-GK62] (archived Feb. 7,
2020).
SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 32, at 89.
33.
34.
Id.
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international banks has contributed to a deeper global market for
banking services. According to Hal Scott and Anna Gelpern, foreign
claims constituted around 23 percent of bank assets in the United
States in 2007, compared to around 90 percent for Switzerland.3 5
Foreign banks in the United States lent out 25 percent of business
loans at the close of 2010.36 As the Crisis's most notable failure,
Lehman Brothers collapsed with around $600 billion worth of assets
located all across the world.3 7 Its insolvency implicated hundreds of
subsidiaries in eighty bankruptcy proceedings across sixteen
jurisdictions, illustrating the unavoidably global nature of modern

markets.3 s
This hypermobility of capital raises red flags for domestic
financial regulators that they cannot address by themselves. First,
cross-border capital flows foster deep information asymmetries. 3 9
Regulators must understand what kinds of risks their home-state
firms are assuming as they conduct business across jurisdictions.
Moreover, their interactions can contribute to system-wide risks that
add an additional and indeterminate valence of danger for possible
import into domestic markets.4 0 As Dan Awrey writes, information
asymmetries can be especially pernicious where firms engage with
innovative and complex financial products.4 1 In the paradigmatically
international market for over-the-counter derivatives-where almost
80 percent of trades in certain securities can sometimes be with

35.
36.
37.

Id.

ScoTT & GELPERN, supra note 32, at 235-46.

Tracey Samuelson, Why Lehman Still Exists Ten Years After Its Collapse,
10, 2018), https://www.marketplacesorg/2018/09/10/why-lehmanstill-exists-ten-years-after-its-collapse/ [https://perma.ce/PN36-U7YK] (archived Feb. 7,
2020).
38.
Id. For a discussion of cross-border large firm insolvency and the insolvencies
affecting Long Term Capital Management, Herstatt Bank, and the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI), see generally Richard Herring, The Challenge of
Resolving Cross Border FinancialInstitutions, 31 YALE J. REG. (2014).
39.
See, e.g., Alan Aherene et al., Information Costs and Home Bias: An Analysis
of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Equities (Fed. Reserve Bank Int'l Fin. Discussion Paper No.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2000/691/ifdp691.pdf
691
2001),
[https://perma.cc/JG6F-QX29] (archived Feb. 7, 2020) (discussing the impact of
information asymmetries on US firms investing in sometimes opaque foreign securities).
40.
See generally Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the
European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1297 (2014) (analyzing the importance of understanding systemic
spillovers in designing banking reform); Emilio Avgouleas, Financial Regulation,
Behavioural Finance, and the Global Credit Crisis: In Search of a New Regulatory Model
1
(May
13,
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
SSRN),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9c22/2054b32e88dd8c6940ef2576fi6lfOedfl f.pdf
[https://perma.c/KE8F-22NV] (archived Feb. 7, 2020) (highlighting the transmission
channels for systemic risk flows).
41.
See Dan Awrey, Regulating FinancialInnovation: A More Principles-Based
Alternative?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. COM. L. 273, 291 (2011); Dan Awrey, The FSA,
IntegratedRegulation, and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives, 13 U. PA. J. BUs. L. 1,
40-60 (2010).
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counterparties from a different jurisdiction-large financial firms have
historically enjoyed ample rein to innovate and invest in opaque
42
Individual firms like the
securities like credit default swaps (CDS).
American International Group (AIG) assumed significant (and thenunknown) levels of exposure to credit risks. Ultimately the broader
collapse of the CDS market triggered systemic spillovers as firms
struggled to manage complex credit risks they had relied on this
market to contain.43 Measuring these risks constitutes an essential
policy objective for regulators whose domestic markets rely heavily on
foreign firms or domestic firms with risky foreign operations for
financial services. Certain EU countries (like the Baltic nations), for
example, have been dominated by foreign banks as critical providers of
deposits and loans, fostering heavy dependence on highly mobile

capital providers.4 4
Secondly, firms do not always have an incentive to report to
regulators as well as to collect information for themselves in order to
ensure that they sufficiently provision for the risks that they assume.
Importantly, the costs of such research can sometimes be prohibitive,
especially in sophisticated and innovative markets. Even diligent firms
may not properly understand the risks that they are taking on (e.g., in
45
Further, they could well
the case of the opaque CDS market).
underestimate the systemic content of their activities owing to
difficulties inherent to the task of guesstimating the risk-taking of
others. In other words, those firms that do take care may still be left
vulnerable where more dangerous ones are able to transmit risks
46
More worryingly, firms
broadly across the market (e.g., AIG).
routinely seek out ways to deliberately amplify their risk-taking by

Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
42.
2763 (2000) (permitting essentially self-regulation by the biggest international firms
that were active in transacting over-the-counter derivatives); PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT 11, 15-17 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-

mkts/Documentslotcact.pdf [https://perma.ce/2Y6Z 2P27] (archived Feb. 7, 2020). On the
international nature of the credit default swap market, see ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra
note 25, at 36-40.
On the regulation of derivatives historically, see Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms
43.
of Derivatives Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1175-77 (2016) (noting that
even with reporting understanding the level of leverage in CDS markets with an

adequate level of granularity can be difficult, if not impossible). For an analysis on the
difficulty of establishing the right amount of bailout funds for AIG, see Noam Schreiber,
Finally, the Truth About the A.I.G. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/opinion/finally-the-truth-about-the-bailouthtml
[https://perma.ce/E3UC-HQM9] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
See, e.g., Vedran Obudina, Estonian Debate Over Foreign Banks, FIN.
44.
OBSERVER (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/in-english/financialmarkets/estonian-debate-over-foreign-banks/ (describing the near total penetration of
the Estonian banking sector by Scandinavian banks) [https://perma.cc/2PZP-VPDU]
(archived Feb. 7, 2020).
Awrey, supra note 43, at 1127-29.
45.
46.
Id. at 54-65.
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carrying out activities in jurisdictions where the regulatory
environment is lax and undemanding. 47 Regulatory divergence
between jurisdictions raises an obvious danger that firms will go where
they are offered a chance to do business within the cheapest and

lowest-rung compliance ecosystem.

48

Thirdly, foreign regulators themselves may not wish to help
remedy information and larger compliance defects. In an effort to boost
their own market's attractiveness and to encourage innovative mobile
capital providers to do business from their borders, countries might
expressly look to create a low-cost regulatory environment in order to
compete. Far from simply looking the other way when firms take risks,
regulators may intentionally deprive themselves of key levers of
control that could otherwise have helped mitigate costly frictions
within their financial markets. Such regulatory generosity to financial
firms was richly bestowed by US authorities in the decade preceding
the Crisis, when legislation was passed to expressly deregulate OTC
derivative markets and to allow complex financial transactions to take

place without systematic reporting and risk-mitigation arrangements
being in place. 4 9 To compete with the European Union (EU) in the run-

up to 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
offered major investment banks a wide berth when it came to
supervising their global operations.5 0 Under the now-defunct
Consolidated Supervised Entities program, the SEC agreed to only
monitor investment banks at the parent-company level, rather than

taking a more granular approach that might have subjected their vast
network of subsidiaries to more careful scrutiny.5i Even where
regulations did bite-for example, when firms were required to file
reports of their activities-the SEC failed to enforce breaches or indeed
to read the filings that were submitted to the agency. 52
International financial regulation thus confronts dynamics that
necessitate a coordinated response from national authorities.
Disappearing boundaries that would once have constrained capital
flows, the digitization of fund transfers, and a proliferation of global
firms that can rapidly transmit the risks and opportunities of finance
render a purely domestically oversight strategy essentially moot. As
made clear by the Crisis and the COVID-19 catastrophe, domestic
regulators confront unpredictable cross-border spillovers of risk,

&

47.
Brummer, How InternationalLaw Works, supra note 28, at 267
48.
Id. at 267. For a seminal treatment of this problem, see Ethiopis Tafara
Robert Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New
InternationalFramework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 50-55 (2007).
49.
See sources cited supra note 42.
50.
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27sec.html
[https://perma.cc/7P2S-M6P8] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
51.
Id.
52. Id.
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information deficits, and a vulnerability to the supervisory deficiencies
of other overseers. The weaknesses of the pre-2008 regulatory modelas is now painfully obvious-resulted in national markets paying an
immeasurably high price economically and politically.

B. Fundamentals of the Post-CrisisRegulatory Order
In response to fallout from the 2008 Crisis, international financial
regulation has undergone a structural recasting to place its workings
on a more credible footing. Scholars have theorized extensively on the
institutionalization of this post-Crisis regulatory order and delivered
their verdict on its many implications for regulatory policy, domestic
53
This Article does not
rulemaking, and administrative legitimacy.
analyze or critique these accounts. Instead, the aim here is to briefly
describe this new design and highlight the levers of influence that have
caused an informal system of cooperation between countries to deliver

transformational
economies.

regulatory

reform

programs

across

domestic

Crafting Standards: standard setting constitutes a basic and
critical goal of international financial regulation. This exercise is
are
Institutions
lines.
around functional
largely
organized
prudential
and
unabashedly technocratic, specializing in banking
regulation (under the Basel Committee), securities markets (IOSCO),
54
and insurance (International Association of Insurance Supervisors).
Their efforts are coordinated under the aegis of the Financial Stability
Board whose membership convenes representatives from the G-20
economies to decide the overall objectives and agenda driving the work
55
of expert standard setters.
This architecture has generated a flurry of standard-setting
activities in the wake of the Crisis, reflecting the preferences of the
major G-20 world economies. These include, for example, updated
standards on the amount and quality of capital that banks must
provision to protect themselves against the fallout from risk-taking.
Regulators have crafted new standards to better safeguard over-thecounter derivatives markets, imposing operational and prudential
standards to mitigate the risks that parties assume vis-a-vis one
another. 56 The post-Crisis regulatory framework also includes more
exacting standards for securitization, credit rating agencies, executive

See, e.g., I3rummer, How InternationalLaw Works, supra note 28, at 265-68;
53.
Hugues-Verdier, supra note 24, at 1459-70; Zaring, supra note 28, at 1262-73.
Brummer, How InternationalLaw Works, supra note 28, at 279.
54.
Work of the FSB, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/
55.
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4LJX-EB69] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
See generally BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 26; Comnittee on
56.
Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 26.
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compensation for bank executives, and corporate governance, as well
as insolvency and creditor rights systems.57
Crucially, standard setters also prescribe benchmarks that
regulators themselves must live up to in order to place domestic
supervisors on a more even playing field. In an effort to foster trust and
mutual reliance, regulators are expected to internally calibrate their
own governance to ensure sound policymaking, monitoring,
transparency, analysis, information sharing with others, and resolving

firm failure. 5 8
Enforcement: scholars of international financial regulation query
exactly why sovereign national regulators appear to dutifully comply
with informal standards when there is no real binding constraint on
them to do so. 59 Rather than formal treaties that would exert maximal
compliance pressure, financial regulation's reliance on less legally
invasive standards should generate frequent defection, apathy, and
inertia in domestic implementation. 6 0 Further, countries that are
likely to suffer costly allocative consequences as a result-for example,
if updated banking laws reduce the capacity of local banks to extend
credit-have strong incentives to forgo efforts at compliance. 61 Yet, as
Chris Brummer has previously highlighted, post-Crisis regulation has
instead been characterized by national regulators committing
seriously to compliance.6 2 This reflects a harder edge to rulemaking
than might first be assumed given the soft nature of standard setting. 63
He posits a number of rationales that explain why domestic regulators
have strong reasons to enact international standards into local legal
systems. 64 First, developing these standards represents an earnestly
undertaken exercise between peer supervisors, creating pressure to
respect the result and implement the needed legislation.65 Secondly,
firms seeking to do business across borders increase pressures on

57.
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, IMPLEMENTING THE FSB PRINCIPLES FOR
SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS: PROGRESS
REPORT (June 2019); Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions,

Global Developments in Securitisation Regulation INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS (Nov. 16,
2012),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD394.pdf
[https://perma.ec/GGY5-GY2E] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); see also Key Standardsfor Sound
Financial Systems, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/aboutthecompendium-of-standards/key standards/
(last
visited
Feb.
18,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/8FRH-JGLX] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
58. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 26; INTI'L ORG. OF SEC.
CoMM'NS, supra note 26, at 4.
59.
Brummer, How International Law Works, supra note 28, at 259-71.
60.
Id. at 259-65.
61.
Id.
62. See generally BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM, supra note 24 (describing how
international financial regulation can be more concrete than it seems); Brummer, How
International Law Works, supra note 28.
63.
Id.
64.
Brummer, How International Law Works, supra note 28, at 284-90.
65. Id.
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national regulators to
stickiness reflects the
transmission channels
assessments by the IMF

implement international standards. Such
ability of large global firms to act as
66
Concretely, periodic
for legal change
and the World Bank increase accountability

for domestic regulators by publicly advertising

the outcomes of

67

regulator benchmarking assessments.
To be sure, the picture is not one of perfect, or even uniform,
compliance. Countries diverge, sometimes in meaningful ways. For
example, domestic legal systems vary in how they calibrate the format
of reporting requirements for derivatives, the composition of protective
resources buffers for financial institutions like clearinghouses, and the
68
In addition, supervisory
scope of activity restrictions for banks.
conventions can depend on such factors as a country's internal
administrative resources for funding national supervisors, the court
system, and the relationships between the supervisor and supervised
firms. 69 However, as evidenced by the widespread adoption of major
regulatory standards post-Crisis, international financial regulation
has exerted a lasting economic impact on financial markets, impacting
capital allocation and the manner in which capital flows between

jurisdictions.

IIL.

THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF FINTECH

As domestic financial systems have retooled to respond to the
lessons learned from the 2008 Crisis, an influx of technological
innovation has catalyzed the prospect of deep structural disruption to
traditional modes of delivering financial services. Tantalizing users
with Silicon Valley-style advances in artificial intelligence, big data,
and consumer experiences enhanced through more direct, digital
interaction with users (e.g., using cellphones or chatbots), "fintech"
represents a new and headline-grabbing cycle of evolution for financial
markets. From cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin to the use of so-called
alternative data to expand access to credit, digital innovation,

66. See BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM, supra note 24, at 33-34; Brummer, How
InternationalLaw Works, supra note 28, at 286-90.
FinancialSector Assessment Program,INT'L MONETARY FUND (June 3, 2019),
67.
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/ 16/14/Financial-SectorAssessment-Program [https://perma.cc/P6D7-MTB2] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
68. ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 36-44; see also Dermot Turing & Yesha
Yadav, The ExtraterritorialRegulation of Clearinghouses, 2 J. FIN. REG. 21 (2016)
(identifying the divergences in the regulation of clearinghouses between the US and the
EU); Julian T.S. Chow & Jay Surti, Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It?
2011),
11/236,
No.
Paper
Working
(IMF
3-4
[https://perma.c/76GGhttps://www~imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wpl1236.pdf
MQW4] (archived Feb. 7, 2020) (noting the activity restrictions for banks under the
Volcker Rule (US) and the Vickers Rule (UK)).
69.
Id.
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automation, big data, and start-up culture are pushing to recalibrate
finance for the twenty-first century. For the most part, regulators have
been caught flat-footed.70 Faced with this surge of innovation postCrisis, they have been forced, in short order, to confront complex
questions about the implications of these new technologies for existing
regulation. 7 1 Is fintech really so different from past cycles of innovation
that current rules are ill adapted to control its risks and harness its
opportunities? Does fintech create novel externalities for financial
markets that present-day regulatory paradigms fail to address? From
the standpoint of international financial regulation, does fintech
demand action from policymakers to craft new transnational strategies
for action-or can post-2008 approaches suffice in providing a
coordinated response? Indeed, is such a response even needed?
This Part briefly introduces and analyzes these changes and the
challenges they pose for regulators. It offers a short survey of fintech
and describe what we see as its key features. In so doing, the discussion
that follows summarizes arguments advanced in earlier work that
posit that fintech represents a truly novel category of innovation
distinct from past iterations of technological evolution in financial
markets.7 2 It suggests that fintech creates unique difficulties for
international regulators that the post-2008 framework is presently
insufficiently equipped to address effectively.
A. The Trade-Offs of RegulatingInnovation in FinancialMarkets
Innovation represents a constant fixture of capital markets.
Creative engineering produced the destructive CDS and junk
mortgage-backed securities of the late 1990s and 2000s. Before that,
regulators handled the transformations initiated by the arrival of
telephones, faxes, and rudimentary computers that helped to gradually
increase the speed and global reach of capital.7 3 Put simply, on the face
of it, fintech should be nothing new: just another page in the history of
markets that are continually evolving, adapting, and growing.74

70.
See Nathaniel Popper, Despite S.E.C. Warning, Wave of Initial Coin Offerings
Grows,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/business/dealbook/initial-coin-offerings-secvirtual-currency.html [https://perma.ce/FAY9-7QM7] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); William
Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance
All Markets Summit, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June
14, 2018) (detailing the complexities of classifying digital assets into existing regulatory
categories, notably those governing the definition of "security" under the Securities Act
1933).
71,
See infranotes 4-5.
72.
See generally Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6 (introducing the fintech
trilemma and defining three novel factors that constitute the salient features of today's
fintech).
73.
Id. at 254-64
74. Id. at 249-64.
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However, earlier work argues that fintech, in fact, presents a novel
species of innovation whose distinctive permutations constitute a
break from past cycles of market ingenuity.
This preceding work introduced the Innovation Trilemma to
capture the trade-offs confronting regulators when they balance the
objectives of encouraging innovation, protecting market integrity, and
75
To be sure, regulators must
legislating through clear rulemaking.

juggle a

multitude

of other considerations,

such

as

ensuring

administrative legitimacy or addressing domestic or international

political concerns. The Trilemma focuses simply on the interplay of
three animating goals out of this larger list of policy objectives. It posits
that, when seeking to manage these three priorities-innovation,
market integrity, and clear and simple rulemaking regulators can, at
76
For example, if
best, achieve only two out of these three aims.
they will
markets,
protect
and
innovation
regulators wish to encourage

only be able to do so through a thick and complex rulebook (e.g., in the
case of the Dodd-Frank Act). 7 7 In balancing investor protection and
rule simplicity (e.g., by straightforwardly banning certain financial
78
Finally, if
activities), financial innovation is likely to suffer.
through
be
realized
to
needs
goal
that
innovation is a guiding
of
broad
kind
the
straightforward regulation (e.g., by implementing

deregulatory permission seen in the 2000s for OTC derivatives), then
market integrity stands to be jeopardized. 79

B. What Defines Fintech?
The regulation of fintech presents challenges for this taxonomy
owing to three constitutive features: (i) a reliance on ever-fuller levels
of artificial intelligence and automation; (ii) the use of entirely new
types of data to calibrate algorithms in the delivery of products and
services; and (iii) a shift away from large, Wall Street banks toward
innovation being guided by nontraditional tech-focused firms that seek
to disintermediate the design of financial products and services, adding
80
efficiencies through technical rather than just financial expertise.
These three factors, when taken together, create a quite novel
proposition for policy designed to situate fintech within historical

75.
Id.
76.
Id.
For example, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to encourage innovation under Titles
77.
VII and IX of the Act by introducing the possibility of greater electronification of the
swaps market while also seeking to maintain the integrity of this market through careful

risk management, reporting and investor protection. The result, as posited by the
Trilemma, is reflected in a technically complex set of rules to govern this innovation. See
Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 721-740, 901 124 Stat. 1376, 1822.
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 249-64.
78.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 264-82.
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trends and to balance the trade-offs that generally underpin the
regulating of innovation.81

Reliance on Automation and Artificial Intelligence: fintech has
flourished in the wake of rapid advances in computing technology and
processing power, fiber optics, and communications tools, as well as the
availability of internet-based cloud storage services for data. Combined
with the rise of a digital generation that has matured alongside the
internet, one well used to procuring services through their
smartphones, the deeper digitization of financial services has arisen in
inevitable response to these wider trends.82 From payments and
lending to investment advisory and stock picking, fintech has
introduced automation and artificial intelligence to the delivery of
once-analog, highly intermediated products and services.8 3 As a result,
instead of just relying on Wall Street banks, brokers, and bricks-and-

mortar investment advisers, financial services can increasingly be
performed by artificially intelligent algorithms-that is, preset
computerized processes that can be programmed to capture data, apply
"intelligent" analysis to value it, and extract an outcome in the form of
a lending decision or determination of which securities to buy and
sell.84

Broadly, artificially intelligent algorithms provide the backbone
for the delivery of a range of fintech products and services.
Computerized instructions, rather than granular human decisionmaking, help guide the production of efficiencies across a variety of
financial services such as lending, stock trading, investing, or

81.
Id.
82.
Mark Carney, Governor. Bank of Eng., Speech at the Mansion House: New
Economy, New Finance New Bank (June 21, 2018); How the Adoption and Evolution of
Cloud Technology are Changing the Fintech Landscape, BLOOMBERO PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/adoptionevolution-cloud-technology-changing-fintech-landscape/ [https://perma.e/3M4C-JTRM]
(archived Feb. 17, 2020).
Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 45, 48-60
83.
(2015); U.K. GOV'T OFFICE FOR SCd, THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL
MARKETS:
AN
INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
30-55
(2012),
https;//www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/taefu

turecomputertradingl012.pdf [https://perma.c/KC4V-3PJ2] (archived Feb. 7, 2020)
(noting the various forces, such as cloud computing, that have facilitated the growth of
various financial technologies); FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
MACHINE LEARNING IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL
https://www. fsh.org/wp3-10
(2017),
STABILITY
IMPLICATIONS
content/uploads/PO11117.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ASV-BM9M] (archived Feb. 7, 2020)
(highlighting the significance of algorithms and artificial intelligence, and their
technological foundations); Sherisse Pham, Facebook Defends Sharing User Data with
2018),
(June
4
Makers,
CNN
Phone
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/04/technology/facebook-apple-samsungblackberry/index.html [https://perma.ec/7AB8-JK5F] (archived Feb. 7, 2020) (discussing
the comfort of younger generations and social media users to easily share data over the
internet).
84.
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 269-75.
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payments. For example, sophisticated algorithms are fast becoming a
85
mainstay in the investment advisory industry. Where a saver might
once have visited a money manager to work out how best to organize
her investment portfolio, this task can instead be accomplished
86
electronically with artificially intelligent firms as the driving engine.
So-called robo-advisors can cut out the traditional intermediary by
relying on algorithms to collect data from the saver and her
preferences, directly inputting this information into statistical and
financial models to decide what kinds of investments would generate
87
the most optimal returns. Algorithms can be designed to "learn" from
the quality of their own processing and rework their own programming
88
in response to feedback. Where they stumble and allocate capital into
unsuccessful investments, they can review and recode to avoid similar
pitfalls in the future.8 9
In other examples, artificially intelligent algorithms have
automated the task of buying and selling securities like shares,
90
Online lending is
treasuries, and exchange-traded derivatives.
adopting algorithms instead of loan officers to decide whether a loan
ought to be extended and on what terms, eroding the usual domain of

intermediaries like banks.91
The expansive appeal of such programs across the financial
market speaks to the enormous gains that artificially intelligent
automation can offer. Computers can extract large quantities of data,
do so at speed, apply highly complex financial models, and decipher
92
patterns from statistics that may not be obvious to human actors.
This can ensure that the allocation of capital rests on a more informed

Id.
85.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
Id.
88.
For discussion, see, e.g., Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo
89.
Advice Across the Financial Services Industry 103 IOwA L. REV. 713 (2018); Barbara
Novick et. al., Iigital Investment Advice: Robo Advisors Come of Age, BLACKROCK (Sept.
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital2016),
investment-advice-september-2016.pdf (noting that automated advisory technologies
can also be harnessed by established incumbents and not just newer entrants)
[https://perma.cc/7RGQ-V42P] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); Update to the Report on the
IOSCO Automated Advice Tools Survey: Final Report, INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'Ns 3
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD552.pdf
(2016),
[bttps://perma.cc/2ZSY-ZB9S] (archived Feb. 7, 2020) (providing an overview of the
major regulatory strategies for robo-advisors).
U.K. GoVT OFFICE FOR SCL, supra note 83.
90.
Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: FinancialInclusion,
91.
Rish Pricing, and Alternative Information 7 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.. Working Paper
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/bank-research2017),
17-17,
No.
conference/annual-17th/papers/14-jagtiani.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZSM-JLQM] (archived
Feb. 7, 2020).
Id. (on automated lending and its potential for increasing financial inclusion);
92.
U.K. Gov'T OFFIcE FOR SCI., supra note 83, at 30-50 (underscoring the gains of
algorithmic markets in the context of securities trading).
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and analytically precise footing. In addition, the use of algorithmsinstead of human, bricks-and-mortar intermediaries-can reduce the
transaction costs that might historically have impeded access to
financial services for excluded or underserved communities. To take
two examples, automated robo-advisors are attracting younger,
millennial investors with the promise of lowered fees and minimum
investment requirements-reflecting cheaper operating costs and
reduced overhead. 93 This group of otherwise neglected savers,
however-with less money and a shorter working history than other
age groups-can thus be motivated to invest earlier than they might
have done before the ready availability of automated robo-advisors. For
historically underserved communities of color-long subject to overt or
implicit discrimination in their ability to access financial servicesartificial intelligence holds out the promise of interacting with a
nonbiased, more data-driven financial system. 9 4
But algorithms also raise concerns for regulators. On the one
hand, algorithms simply automate existing financial functions-like
picking stocks, deciding whether to make a loan, or helping savers
invest for retirement. 95 Yet their use history remains limited and their
longer-term effects on capital allocation untested. Algorithms within a
particular industry-such as money managing-may use common
assumptions and models and respond in similar ways to new
information, potentially amplifying the reaction. Scholars have drawn
into relief the potential risks of algorithms creating correlated risks in
the aggregate. 96 For example, if all millennials automatically allocate
their savings into common risk pools (given their age and limited
savings), the wider effects on this community may be problematic if
such investments are all affected by a large disruptive shock in the
future, hurting their collective savings all at once.9 7
Importantly, regulators and market participants suffer from steep
information gaps to work out how an artificially intelligent algorithm
is likely to perform over time. Commonly described as a "black box,"
the manner in which algorithms reprogram themselves, what explains
their decision-making, and how this process may shift in response to
evolving conditions can often be impervious to scrutiny. 9 8 These

&

93.
Ilana Polyak, Millennials and Robo-advisors: A Match Made in Heaven?
CNBC (June 22, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/21/millennials-and-robo-advisorsa-match-made-in-heaven.html [https:/perma.cc/VMD4-HR5J] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
94.
On the promise of fintech for financial inclusion, see generally Jagtiani
Lemieux, supra note 91, at 4-6.
95.
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 269-75.
96.
Id.
97.
See, e.g., Baker & Dellaert, supra note 89. For a discussion of the literature,
see Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, 269-75, 278-82.
98.
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BoX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 19-25 (2015); Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the
Heart
of
AI,
MIT
TECH.
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(Apr.
11,
2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/
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information gaps will be especially costly if artificially intelligent
algorithms make decisions in a manner that, while privately profitable
for any individual market actor, create wider risks for the system as a
whole. For example, a trading algorithm can generate profit by
behaving manipulatively or disruptively, reaping gains for its firm,
99
Algorithms
while compromising the larger integrity of the system.
to
turbulent
too
it
becomes
can be programmed to exit the market if
1 01
1 00
In
the
trader.
for
a
losses
the
This will limit
continue operations.
aggregate, however, the market suffers as a whole where available
for
Worryingly
suddenly. 102
disappear
opportunities
trading
10 3
Analyzing
predict.
to
difficult
policymakers, these externalities are
the underlying programming of an artificially intelligent algorithm
may fail to yield any real insight about its future performance if such
a program can recode itself in response to the feedback it receives.
Further, the costs of bad or risky programming can be difficult to
control ex post. In the world of high frequency algorithms, a market1 04
In the case of online or moneywide crash can unfold in milliseconds.
management algorithms, an impression of their allocative impact may

not fully emerge for years. 105

One solution here would look to big data as a remedy to cure the
informational deficits created by smart algorithms. As earlier work
notes, reliance on big data represents a further defining feature of
fintech. 106 Algorithms need data in order to function. With computing
power growing continuously and information ever-more readily digital,
the amount and types of data that algorithms can process have surged

[https://perma.cc/6KYB-K6CJ] (archived Feb. 7, 2020). But see Vijay Pande, Opinion
Editorial, Artificial Intelligence's "Black Box" Is Nothing to Fear, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 25,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/opinionlartificial-intelligence-black2018),
box.html [https://perma.ec/B5ET-RG6E] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
See, e.g., Alexander Osipovic, Futures Exchange Reins In Runaway Trading
99.
Algorithms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/futures-exchange[https://perma.c/QF5E-65DV]
reins-in-runaway-tradingalgorithms-11572377375
(archived Feb. 7, 2020).
100. Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV.
1031, 1080-85 (2016).

101. Id.
102. Id. (noting the tendency of traders to individually exit the market during a
crisis. This strategy, while privately gainful, is problematic if a large segment of traders
all exit at once, draining liquidity).
103. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Opinion Editorial, Algorithms Had Themselves a
Treasury
Flash
Crash,
BLOOMBERG
L.P.
(July
13,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-07-13/algorithms-had-themselves-atreasury flash-crash [https://perma.ec/A4TG-962A] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
104. See, e.g., UNITED STATES TREASURY ET AL., JOINT STAFF REPORT: THE U.S.
ON
OCTOBER
15,
2014,
at 15-19 (July 13, 2015),
TREASURY MARKET
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/276/joint-staff-report-the-us treasury-market-on10-15-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPP6-8UWC] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); Levine, supra
note 103.
105. Baker & Dellaert, supra note 89.
106. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 265-69.
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in recent years. 107 The availability of cloud-based storage, powerful
computing, online sharing, and the spreading multiplicity of sources
offer algorithms a data environment of unprecedented richness.1 08 This
phenomenon is uniquely modern. In the 2000s, about 25 percent of the
world's stored information existed in digital form; today, only about 2
percent of all such information remains analog.1 09 This newness is
reflected in the availability of innovative data sources that are distinct
from those traditionally used by financial services providers.
Algorithms are able to scrape social media sites and mine GPS data,
online shopping habits, social contacts, and weather patterns-socalled alternative data points that can bolster information conveyed by
more well-known sources like balance sheets, income statements,
price-related information from trading markets, or routine corporate

disclosures."

0

This proliferation of big data can constitute powerful fuel for
smart algorithms as a way to make financial services more accurate,
calibrated, and responsive to signals contained in a mix of information.
In online lending, for example, big and alternative data is much touted
by fintech lenders as a basis for ensuring that loans more precisely and
fairly reflect borrower risk. 1 ' New kinds of digital data can offer a
creative way for lenders to look beyond conventional information
sources like credit scores or income statements-that may be in short
or patchy supply for certain demographic groups such as millennials or
communities of color facing historic exclusion from the financial
system. In observing factors such as social contacts, online shopping
habits, or the quality of the punctuation in a borrower's text messages,
lenders claim that big data and sophisticated algorithms can help

107. Navigating
Big
Data
in
the
Cloud
FINRA
TECH.,
https://technology.finra.org/articles/fastola.html
(last visited
Feb.
18,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/V8ZN-RFHY] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
108. Id.
109. Kenneth Neil Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Rise of Big Data,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May-June 2013), https://www foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-0403/rise-big-data [https://perma.cc/V7XF-2P9H] (archived Feb. 7, 2020). For detailed
discussion, see generally KENNETH NEIL CUKIER & VIKTOR MAYER-ScHOENBERGER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HoW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013).
110. Kevin McPartland, Alternative Data for Alpha, GREENWICH (Jan. 31, 2017)
https://www.greenwich.com/equities/alternative-data-alpha
[https://permaec/8W7W4XER] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); Phillip Stafford, Rise of Machine Trading Forces Data
Providersto Pivot, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8099ed9e-f02811e9-adle-4367d8281195 [https:/perma.cc/W9FV-45GH] (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
111. See Charles Lane, Will UsingArtificial Intelligence to Make Loans Trade One
Kind
of
Bias for
Another?,
NAT'L
PUB.
RADIO
(Mar.
31,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltecheonsidered/2017/03/31/52194621 0/will-usingartificial-intelligence-to-m ake-loans-trade-one-kind-of-bias-for-anot
[https://perma.ce/ET57-BLZF] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).
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reduce instances of discrimination and bias by providing a more
informative gauge of real credit risk.1
Similarly, in securities markets, investors are paying handsomely
for feeds of alternative data as a means of getting that all-important
edge. By feeding algorithms with seemingly new kinds of
information-like social media feeds, visual data from drones, or
airline ticket purchases-investors expect such data to offer deeper
insights into market movements than might otherwise have been
11 3
possible through the usual data sources.

Without question, big data holds out the promise of great gains for
market participants as well as for regulators looking to gain granular
insight into market behavior. But caution is also in order. For one, this
data is only as reliable as the credibility of its sources. The sheer
diversity of data producers-from social media and online news feeds
to academic studies from around the world-creates demonstrable risk
that such sources may be compromised and impossible for any private
11 4
"Fake news,"
or public entity to regulate for authenticity.
twitterbots, the overall superficiality and manipulability of social
media, or the multiplicity of online news feeds represent a first source

of risk.1 15 Whereas past eras may have seen certain data sources-like
credit reporting agencies or exchanges-become undisputed major
data intermediaries, big data creates a much more chaotic information
environment.n Crucially, it remains largely untested longitudinally.
Without more evidence and a long-term history of use, regulators and
market participants cannot credibly determine the effectiveness of big
11 7
More to the
and alternative data for purposes of capital allocation.
point, the emergence of entirely new types of data, like social media
feeds, cellphone contacts, or online shopping habits, represent an
innovative new frontier in risk measurement whose probative utility
remains largely unknown for now.
To be sure, regulators have long faced questions about the longerterm effects of new financial innovation. As made clear by the postCrisis fallout, the complex modeling underlying OTC derivatives like
CDS confounded regulators and market participants. Policymakers
had little idea about the destructive potential of new financial
1 8
It is
engineering and its impact on long-term capital allocation.

112. Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 91, at 4-6 (investigating whether fintech and
alternative data can promote the goals of financial inclusion); Lane, supra note 111.
113. McPartland, supra note 110; Stafford, supra note 110.
114. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 268-69.

115. Id.
&

116. For a discussion and sources, see generally id.; see also Madeline Lamo
Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 998 (2019) (noting the proliferation
of influential bots across the internet).
117. Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 91, at 7-9 (showing the difficulties of
analyzing successes for financial inclusion).
118. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 254-62.
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therefore not especially novel that regulators must deal with unknown
algorithms or new kinds of data given that, in many ways, such
information deficits constitute a baked-in risk of cycles of market
creativity.
But fintech charts a new course by challenging incumbent
dominance
through
the
introduction
of
new,
tech-focused
entrepreneurs as key drivers of innovation. Conventionally, regulators
have long looked to big Wall Street firms as the major hubs of activity
and financial creativity.1 1 9 Innovation in the pre-2008 derivatives
markets, for example, was expressly permissioned on the fact that it
would be led by the biggest and most established financial firms.' 2 0
Fintech, by contrast, is characterized by a much greater diversity of
central players that encompass social media and Silicon Valley tech
giants like Amazon, WeChat, Google, Facebook, and Apple, new
entrants like Betterment or Robinhood as well as start-ups that offer
tech-savvy alternatives to well-worn financial products and services.1 2 1
In some cases, fintech firms seek to take on major banks and
investment banks on their own turf: online lenders, to take one
example, can compete on account of their avowed expertise in utilizing
a broader array of alternative data; user-friendly, digital-only
interfaces; and reduced overhead than traditional bricks-and-mortar
players.1 22 By more directly targeting users online (e.g., online lending,
robo-advising), fintech is reducing the dominance of Wall Street
intermediaries and introducing a culture where users and service
providers interact on a more disintermediated basis.
Other fintech firms, however, look to enhance the efficiencies of
existing, incumbent-dominated market structure. This is evident in
the context of the payments industry-where online peer-to-peer
payment systems like Venmo, ApplePay, or PayPal-offer an add-on
service for bank or credit-card users, rather than a way to replace them
altogether.12 3 By offering a cellphone-based, digital wallet, Apple Pay
permits users to harness encryption-based communications technology
as a way to transfer payments-related data between their phones and
a merchant.12 4 Similarly, incumbents themselves are harnessing
fintech-based products, either building their own versions of emerging

119. Id. at 275-78.
120. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000).
121. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 275-78.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Apple Pay, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apple-pay/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2020) [https://perma.cc/GGD6-MPXDJ (archived Feb. 7, 2020); XRP: The DigitalAsset for
Payments, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/insights/xrp-digital-asset-payments/ (last visited
Feb. 18, 2020) (a token-based payment service designed to reflect value transfers within
the international banking system and to overcome inefficiencies in correspondent
banking systems) [https://perma.ce/Z6RG-FYAV (archived Feb. 17, 2020).
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technologies, 12 5 assimilating new entrants into their own larger
26
organizations, or developing their own innovative products.1
In short, far from simply regulating the usual cohort of traditional
Wall Street firms, fintech brings together a much more diverse and
crowded set of players that vary in size and experience in the financial
industry. As they make themselves more valuable by offering services
such as digital wallets, encryption technology, cloud storage, and data

aggregation, Silicon Valley is blurring into Wall Street, holding out a
more complex regulatory proposition for policymakers.
The interplay of fintech's defining features-its use of algorithms,
big data, and a leading role played by nontraditional firms that are
breaking the dominance of traditional intermediaries-heightens the

difficulties

inherent

to the

Trilemma.'

27

Artificially

intelligent

algorithms introduce deep information asymmetries that impede a
clear understanding of what kinds of risks they pose for market
integrity. 2 8 While big data may go some way toward remedying the
deficit, it is far from a panacea. New kinds of alternative data remain
untested. And the quality of information may become tainted by data
29
The variety and volume
whose provenance is of questionable quality.'
of data sources can impede how easily and cheaply market actors
130
Further, verifying data
extract insights from this information.
31
within this more chaotic environment can be difficult in real time.1
As a consequence of such steep information gaps, regulators face
serious challenges in understanding risks and legislating for them
32
Finally, regulators confront the new problem
through clear rules.'
that fintech innovation is being led by smaller, nontraditional firms
that are disintermediating financial services and/or enlarging the
33
As a
financial supply chain through discrete products and services.'
consequence, a high compliance burden created by complex rulemaking

is impracticable within a market that is populated with start-ups and
13 4
Such firms bring innovation, but they can
nonfinancial specialists.
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132. Id. at 278-83.
133. Id.
134. Id.

1134

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL 53:1109

lack the experience and resources to absorb the costs of the (often
opaque) externalities being created by fintech.13 5

IV. FINTECH AND THE CHALLENGE FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION

Fintech represents a profoundly creative force in financial
regulation with obvious global reach. Cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin,
have explicitly committed to a transnational, poststatist conception of
monetary design.1 3 6 Social media behemoths, like Facebook and
WeChat, are looking to transform themselves into pillars of the global
payments ecosystem.1 3 7 Regulators are enthusiastically courting
innovators from around the world to bring their inventions and
experiments to domestic markets as a way of showcasing their own
leadership and farsighted vision.1 3 8
But just as with modern finance, the global ambition and
entrepreneurial potential of fintech (e.g., Libra) creates the risk that
harms from a failed product can spread widely across borders. Where
a major payments provider experiences an outage, suffers a
cyberattack, or goes bankrupt, the costs could redound across multiple
jurisdictions and impact vulnerable consumers in similar ways,
irrespective of nationality.13 9 Beyond the worst-case risk of outright
failure, innovations with transnational appeal raise thorny questions
revolving around day-to-day concerns about crafting commonly
accepted standards of investor protection, data security, prudential
provisioning, reporting, monitoring, and enforcement.1 4 0

135.

For a full discussion, see id. at 279-83.
Steven Johnson, Beyond the Bitcoin Bubble, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/magazine/beyond-thebitcoin-bubble.html
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579 (2018) (discussing the US government's creation of a "sandbox" for innovators to try
out start ups with less regulatory constraint); Michelle Price, Hong Kong, Singapore
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[https://perma.c/756V9K5P] (archived Apr. 6, 2020).
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The discussion below reveals that fintech poses a particularly
thorny challege for international financial regulation. First, as
highlighted in earlier work, fintech complicates the usual trade-offs
involved in the Trilemma of balancing innovation, market integrity,
and rules simplicity. This complexity is further exacerbated by the
difficulties inherent in regulating markets through simple, clear rules
where national legal systems, legislative and administrative processes,
as well as enforcement practices vary considerably by jurisdiction.
Secondly, the growth of fintech highlights a turn away from the historic
cadre of developed countries being the major drivers of financial
innovation-and thus the likely key suppliers of regulatory standards
and enforcement, increasing negotiation costs faced by global standard
setters. With digital innovation flourishing in developing countries as
well as from developed ones, agenda setters in international financial
regulation look set to become more diffuse and heterogenous
geographically. Finally, the objectives of rules clarity and financial
innovation are especially difficult to achieve where national markets
vary in the extent to which new firms and technologies are structurally
disintermediating their home markets. Developing clear rules that
cater to an arriving class of new tech-focused firms is a task that is
made even more intractable in contexts where countries diverge in how
fully fintech has reshaped their markets and encourged nontraditional
players to disintermiate and supplant the old guard of banks and
investment banks.
A. Information Deficits as Barriersto Cooperation and Clear

Rulemaking
As noted in Part

II, fintech is characterized by steep information

deficits on account of artificially intelligent algorithms and the
untested nature of new kinds of digital data. With big data and smart
algorithms essential to much of fintech, the difficulties of fully
understanding the import of these technologies pose a real problem for
protecting global market integrity through clear and simple standard
workable,
of crafting
challenge
the
Importantly,
setting.
straightforward rules for fintech suffers a further and significant
hurdle in international financial regulation. In contrast to domestic
regulation that primarily legislates for a home market using local
administrative and enforcement practices, international rulemaking
must account for a multitude of diverging legal environments. This can

[https://perma.ce/9AK5-YBR3] (archived Apr. 6, 2020); Monitoring of FinTech, FIN.
https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-development/additionalBD.,
STABI IuIy
policy-areas/monitoring-of-fintech/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TL65QRUC] (archived Apr. 6, 2020) (setting out the Financial Stability Board's work-program
for the global monitoring of fintech).
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invariably add difficulty to achieving consensus between countries on
new standards as well as their adoption into home regulatory systems.

The ability for businesses to create cross-border products and
services adds to the information deficits already pervasive to fintech.
First, regulators must determine how adaptable innovations are to
differing national financial systems. Lending algorithms designed to
analyze alternative data and to attribute a value to this input can
suffer if these data points might have different weights in different
countries. The "meaning" attached to regular purchases of cigarettes
and alcohol, for example, may be different in a jurisdiction where such
practices are frowned upon socially relative to those where they are
common and more culturally accepted. While such lending algorithms
usually build an overall profile from the various impressionistic data
points available to them, mistakes and ambiguities in scoring certain
kinds of data across jurisdictions may lead to systematically skewed
loan books for some countries. In other words, the artificial intelligence
underlying complex fintech can end up making determinations from
the analytical starting point of programming conceived and designed
for Country X, even though this program is also running in Countries
Y and Z. What impact this might have over time and the credit risks it
might create for a cross-border fintech represents a question that
regulators can only solve through close cooperation and information
sharing. Artificially intelligent programs that reprogram themselves
over time can pose especially tough information deficits. If such
algorithms are trained on data that is procured from Country A, with
limited economic and racial inequities, how well will its programming
perform in a more unequal environment?
Relatedly, regulators might rightfully worry about the quality of
the data that fintech innovators are using. An automated money
manager deploying long-term allocative algorithms may be relying on
data of untested quality and reliability. It may overweigh new types of
data such as GPS information, metadata, social media sentiment
analysis, and so on. Probing and testing new kinds of data,
understanding their valence, and determining which kinds have real
informative potential represents a task that regulators can struggle to
perform individually. Certain country regulators may be more familiar
with the workings of some categories of new data (e.g., social media)
but not of others (e.g., metadata analysis). In all, regulators are all
likely to suffer from information deficits regarding the authenticity of
data sources (e.g., fake news), how to ascribe meaning to new data
types, and how this data impacts the efficacy of financial algorithms

within their jurisdictions.
Secondly, regulators may struggle to determine how well fintech
from other countries is likely to fit into the payment and settlement
systems, risk measurement, and mitigation mechanisms within their
own country. In other words, host countries will want to know how
interoperable a new innovation will be with the operational and

20201
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technological systems of local firms and infrastructure. Where a new
innovation lacks synchronicity with another country's financial
system, it can be susceptible to unpredictable failures or cause
disruptions for other firms that rely on a new fintech. Understanding
questions of interoperability can be difficult within an environment
dominated by rapidly moving algorithms. For example, an innovation
may work well in testing because user volumes are low and the
strained
Under
predictable.
relatively
logistical environment
conditions, the same algorithms may struggle to cope with high
demand and to adjust their behavior accordingly. For example, an
online peer-to-peer payments processor will have to achieve fluid
interoperability within the country's payment system connecting its
banks, credit card companies, and consumers. It will need to use
country-specific levels of encryption and ensure that payments data is
stored according to domestic rules. Where a system builds its service
into social media services like Facebook, its payment services will have
to link into these platforms. Within such a complex ecosystem, an
innovation can be susceptible to failures at different parts of the supply
chain. It may only weakly encrypt data. Communicating data
accurately to and from local banks may be partial, easily disrupted, or
suffer an outage during periods of particularly high demand.
Finally, algorithms and decentralized data flows can build
complex interconnections between country financial systems that may
be unknown to single regulators alone. Fintech innovations in Country
Y may deploy technologies developed through testing and oversight in
Country Z, creating dependence on the surveillance and certification
systems of Country Z. Regulators in Country Z may not necessarily be
fully aware of the costs of their decisionmaking as innovations licensed
by them are transposed into different national market ecosystems.
Take the case of India, for example, where the national database of
biometric identification information for citizens includes data on over

one billion people. 141 Regulators might question whether encryption
that is licensed to work within a smaller, less centralized information
environment is adequate to fully protect enormous volumes of Indian
citizen data, given the value that such a unique database would have
for bad actors. Information sharing and coordination between
countries is thus essential to the task of finding out and ensuring that
the cross-border
national regulators can better understand

interdependencies created by their decisions.
deficits-and the
These information

analytical

cost

of

understanding how fintech innovations vary in how they operate in
different markets-impede a real grasp of the risks they pose to global
market integrity. Where regulators cannot easily share information
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and collectively decipher the workings of artificially intelligent
algorithms, none may really understand what content is needed to
populate a global regulatory standard. Moreover, such frictions are

magnified by the difficulties of understanding how different markets,
legal systems, and regulators might respond to the risks create by
fintech. A failure of a digital payments processor active in Country A,
for example, may be unexpectedly damaging for its economy relative to
Country B's owing to a historic absence of banks and investment
banks, a younger, more impoverished population, and limited

government resources to counteract the losses. As a result, these
national differences in market, legal, and administrative environments
foster even greater difficulties for the Trilemma. Imposing clear and
straightforward global standards for opaque products faces a near
herculean challenge where such rules must navigate varying national
regimes and be implemented into diverging legal and market

environments. The Trilemma highlights the long odds faced by
domestic regulators seeking to legislate simply in response to fintech.
For international standard setters, looking to legislate across borders,
these trade-offs become even sharper.

B. Diffuse Regulatory Power and Increased Negotiation Costs
Greaterdiversity in fintech standardsetters: fintech increases the
negotiation costs involved in developing new standards owing to a
larger and more economically diverse set of country actors now actively
dominant in delivering innovation. The complexities of applying the
Trilemma to fintech, especially in the cross-border context, sharpen the
need for international regulators to cooperate and coordinate in
standard setting and enforcement. Yet, in confronting this task,
regulators must also adapt to a new landscape in which the usual

cohort of developed economies are no longer the major locus of financial
innovation. As a result, a more diffuse group of countries-developed
and developing-possess an economic stake in becoming agenda
setters for fintech and in exporting their domestic standards
internationally, likely increasing the time and effort involved in
negotiating new rules.
China's rapid adoption of online payments and lending
technologies is case in point. In 2017, mobile payment platforms
processed around RMB 14.5 trillion or 16 percent of GDP.142 Launched
in 2011, WeChat Pay boasts around 900 million active users, or 65
percent of the population. Alipay, having started business in 2004,
hosts around 500 million active monthly users, or 36 percent of the
overall population. 1 43 Ant Financial, in its online lending business, had

142. Frost et al., supra note 18, at 5-8.
143. Id.
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lent out a total of RMB 645 billion ($95 billion) at the end of 2017.14
WeBank had around RMB47.7 billion ($8 billion) in credit extended to
consumers as of 2017, and cumulatively lent around RMB 870 billion

($127 billion).14 5
Across Asia, as much as in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, regulators are jostling ever more vigorously to capture
the latest in tech talent within their jurisdictions. The proliferation of
to
entrepreneurs
for example-allowing
sandboxes,
national
experiment and test out their inventions within a controlled
environment-is illustrative, having set off an international race
1 46
Intense competition between
between countries to find big winners.
countries has prompted regulators to create tantalizing incentives for

innovators to come to their markets and test out novel financial
47

technologies.1
This geographical diversity stands in contrast to past eras in
financial innovation, where major technological exports-such as
or
CDS,
like
products
derivatives
over-the-counter
ATMs,
14 8
securitization-have originated largely from developed economies.

Unsurprisingly, regulators from these markets have played an
outsized role in shaping the policy priorities of international standard
149
setters, such as the Basel Committee and IOSCO, historically.

To be sure, following the 2008 Crisis, a broader grouping of G-20
countries has become the organizing hub for post-Crisis standard
setting. As a result, major economies such as those of China, India,
Brazil, South Korea, and South Africa now have a formal seat at the
table of decision-makers. Nevertheless, the thrust of post-Crisis
financial regulatory reform has still fixed on the problems arising out
of the fallout in the United States and the European Union as the basis
for setting the agenda for reform. Indeed, scholars have pointed to the
adaptive strategies that developing countries routinely have to follow
in order to adopt international standards (such as those governing
15 0
Bank
bank capital) into their domestic markets and legal systems.
developed
in
force
protective
capital standards, that may act as a

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Allen, supra note 138.
147. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, at 294-97.
148. Harry Wilson, A Short History of the CDS, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 6, 2011);
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8745511/A-shorthistory-of-credit-default-swaps.html [https://perma.cc/PYG8-ZJY8] (archived Feb. 7,
2020); see also Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6, 249-63.
149. See TARULLO, supra note 17, at 15-42; see also CAMFFERMAN & ZEFF, supra
note 17, at 295.

150. Caio Ferreira, Nigel Jenkinson & Christopher Wilson, From Basel I to Basel
Paper No.
III: Sequencing Implementation in Developing Economies 5 (IMF Working
6
19/127, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/0 /14/From-Basel-Ito-Basel-III-Sequencing-Implementation-in-Developing-Economies-46895
[https://perma.cc/5K4L-G93A] (archived Feb. 7, 2020).

1140

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53.1109

economies, may result in constraining scarce credit flows within an
emerging market. 151

Implications of Diffuse Agenda Setters: the greater variety of
potential decision-makers for international fintech offers up a number
of novel considerations for policymakers seeking to overcome the
Trilemma in international financial regulation.

An initial difficulty, as outlined above, lies in fully understanding
what risks regulators need to control and how these might impact their
home jurisdictions and the interconnections that bridge markets across
borders. Information asymmetries attaching to algorithms and big
data are pervasive and remain unsolved. Moreover, innovations in
fintech have, at least thus far, avoided triggering major cross-border
collapses to sound the alarm and trigger collective action. To be sure,
automated stock exchanges have suffered outages on account of faulty
systems. 15 2 Bitcoin trading platforms have collapsed overnight to the
distress of holders across multiple jurisdictions. 153 However, fintech,
at least so far, lacks a large and systemic crisis that might have
motivated action to calibrate standards.
Put more simply, regulators lack a clear understanding of the
costs that a failure to regulate fintech globally might entail. Whereas
the 2008 Crisis made the price of inaction abundantly clear, discrete
crises pertaining to singular innovations (e.g., crypto exchanges) have
failed to catalyze real action and to focus the minds of policy makers

on a goal.
Additionally, fintech from emerging economies can force
regulators to face a more complex market environment where large
banks and investment banks may not always be the major players. In
other words, future standards have to provide a fit for countries where
nonbank firms such as AliPay, WePay or, PayTM play a leading role in
delivering financial services and products. Put even more simply,
standard setting can no longer assume that banks, hedge funds,
mutual funds, or clearinghouses will necessarily comprise the core
cohort of regulated companies. Instead, divergences in national
markets may well see the likes of tech companies, telecoms, or online

151. Id. (noting differential distributive costs within jurisdictions).
152. Graeme Wearden, London Stock Exchange Hit By Worst Outage Since 2011,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/aug/16/londonstock -exchange -hit-by-worst-outage-since-2011 [https://perma.ce/BNL9-8ZYS] (archived
Feb. 7, 2020).
153. Billy Bambrough, A Major CanadianBitcoin Exchange Has a Major Problem,
FORBES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2019/02/05/amajor-canadian-bitcoin-exchange-has-a-big-problem/#73d20ee75236
[https://perma.cc/XFS5-HN6Z] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); Doug Watt, 45% of Bitcoin
Exchanges Fail, COINDESK (Apr. 23, 2013), https://www.coindesk.com/45-percent-ofbitcoin-exchanges-fail-study-finds
[https://perma.cc/FNW6-JF2H] (archived Feb. 7,
2020). On the ability of smaller fintech players to trigger systemic crisis, see Magnuson,
supra note 16, at 1169-72.
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retailers join the ranks of those supervised by financial regulatory

authorities.
Relatedly, the more fundamental issue here speaks to the role
played by fintech in different economies to fulfill local demand for
financial services that may have gone unmet by banks. That is to say,
the reasons for the local popularity of certain fintech may reflect the
superior ability of certain innovations to fulfill unmet need for services
within the financial system. For historically underdeveloped markets,
lacking a sound payments system, reliable banks, or affordable credit,
fintech can help fill gaps in the availability of financial services. As a
result, the footprint of particularly popular innovations can run
especially deep in some countries relative to those that have been well
served by a more sophisticated financial market for longer. To take one
example, mobile payment services by fintech firms have gained rapid
ground in China and other developing economies like Kenya or
India. 154 When the Indian government decided to demonetize certain
currency overnight-turning some denominations into worthless
paper-the population turned to electronic wallets and payment
processors as a way to overcome the lack of cash within the system.
PayTM, a local electronic provider of digital wallets, saw its user base
explode, growing from 110 million in 2016 to around 280 million in the
space of a year.1 55 Often underserved countries may well have lacked
prior penetration of bank account and credit card products. Evidencing

this gap, many fintech firms (e.g., AliPay or WeChat Pay) have had to
build their own payment networks to service local populations rather
than relying on existing bank or credit card systems 156 By contrast,
the United States, with a more developed payments environment, has
seen a smaller uptake of mobile payment services (as measured by
percent of GDP). 157 US Fintech products like ApplePay have been able
to utilize existing bank and credit card networks as the basis for their
15 8
product offerings.
An international financial regulatory framework, animated by a
more varied and economically diverse range of agenda setters, can
require regulators to confront more complex and costly bargaining
costs in crafting new standards for fintech. In particular, the varying
distributive impact of fintech innovations-and their ability to fill gaps
in the availability of local financial services-complicates the difficulty
of developing international standards.

154. Frost et al., supra note 18, at 5-9.
155. Suman Layak, After Note Ban Boost, It's Time for the Next Growth Triggerfor
Paytm, ECON. TIMEs (Nov. 5, 2017), https://economictimes.indiatimes.comlsmallbiz/startups/after-note-ban-boost-its-time-for-the-next-growth-trigger-forpaytm/articleshow/6151'0703.crs?from=mdr [https://perma.ec/XLB2-YMNY] (archived
Feb. 7, 2020).
156. Frost et al., supra note 18, at 5-9.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Importantly, domestic regulators may be especially wary of
agreeing to rules that increase the costs of procuring core financial
services in their countries. Where a historical paucity of services has
stymied economic growth and development, regulators may be reticent
to give up the gains made. They may fear popular backlash, worry

about losing their reputation as innovation leaders, and fear missing
out on future talent that might bring entrepreneurship to their
domestic markets. The cut-throat competition between regulators,

notably in the Asia-Pacific

region,

to build

innovation-friendly

sandboxes highlights the resources and reputation being deployed by

domestic regulators to nurture fintech innovation to meet local
needs.1 5 9 Giving up on hard-won economic gains will be especially
unpalatable in the presence of information asymmetries on the risks of
innovation. Without a clear idea of costs, the urgency of investing in
international standard setting and implementation is likely to be

limited.
In sum, regulating fintech internationally is likely to impose
higher negotiating and decision costs than in prior years owing to the
emergence of powerful economies as key voices in agenda setting. Past
eras have permitted a cadre of developed economies to lead rule setting
owing to their significance as major global money centers, where those
rules would have an outsize impact. By contrast, as emerging
economies take center stage in innovating, fintech standards will have
to more expressly take into account a broader array of economies,
distributive concerns, and public policy goals for financial markets.
C. Bridging Differences in National Market Structure
International standard setting for fintech faces the daunting
challenge of crafting rules that are applicable to markets at varying
stages of structural disruption by new and disintermediating fintech.
As noted by the Trilemma, protecting market integrity and
innovation through clear rules must now contend with the prospect of
ensuring these rules can be absorbed by a more varied type of firm: not
only traditional banks and investment banks but also start-ups, tech

specialists, or retail behemoths like Alibaba or Apple. Such newcomers
have disintermediated services offered by conventional financial firms
(e.g., in online lending, payments processing, or wealth management)
and enhanced financial supply chains by offering user-friendly
products like digital wallets. Imposing complex rules to both protect

market integrity and financial innovation thus represents a poor fit to

159. See, e.g., Price, supra note 138. Singapore recently launched its "sandbox
express,' designed to encourage testing of ideas within three weeks. Alanna Tan, MAS
Launches 'Sandbox Express' So Fintech Firms Can Start Testing Ideas Within 3 Weeks,
VULCAN POsT (Aug. 7, 2019), https://vulcanpost.com/671638/mas-fintech-sandboxexpress-singapore/ [https://perma.cc/44C7-C9ZQ](archived Feb. 7, 2020).
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match the profile of these fintech firms that may lack the resources,
expertise, and experience to internalize high compliance costs.
International financial regulation further exacerbates this
difficulty as standards have to be sufficiently flexible and adaptive to
oversee national markets at various stages of fintech adoption. In other
words, national markets vary in the degree to which traditional
financial products, services, and firms have been structurally impacted
by fintech. As discussed above, for example, China, India, and Kenya
have experienced expansive adoption of non-bank-driven fintech

exemplified by the successes of firms like AliPay, WePay, M-Pesa, or
PayTM.i 60 By contrast, other economies like the United States
continue to rely on a mix of Wall Street firms as well as fintechs,
offering a bevy of products and services and showcasing different
intensities of disintermediation. Where popular services like Apple Pay
or Venmo offer add-ons to traditional bank or credit-card driven
intermediation, online lenders and robo-advisors have sought to effect
1
a sharper break from the usual Wall Street old guard. 61
The depth of fintech adoption and the degree of structural change
underway in different markets increases the difficulty of crafting
standards that are globally acceptable and capable of widespread
implementation. In ecomomies experiencing intense structural
disintermediation (e.g., where payments firms have developed their
own non-bank-affiliated processing networks), complex rules carrying
a high compliance burden and designed for adoption by banks may
prove deeply unpopular. By contrast, in countries that still maintain
high degrees of traditional intermediation and where regulated
financial firms predominate, a light set of rules may fail to impose
sufficiently strict controls on firms that are practiced in taking risks,
perhaps backstopped by government support (e.g., through deposit
insurance). Divergences in national market structures thus present a
major challenge for international financial regulation seeking to craft
a uniform and well-fitting set of standards designed to be adopted
across economies. In addition to information deficits, divergences in
national legal systems, and higher negotiation costs, a new and more
diverse cast of financial firms further complicate the task of navigating
the poles of the Trilemma in international financial regulation.

V. CONCLUSION

Fintech represents a new chapter in financial regulation that
marks a break from past cycles of innovation. Its unique featuresreliance on intelligent algorithms, big data, and the flourishing of
nonfinancial firms within the ranks of the more seasoned-amplify

160.
161.

Frost et al., supra note 18, at 11. Thanks to Chris Brummer for this insight.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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existing trade-offs in regulating financial markets. Earlier work
proposed the Innovation Trilemma as an analytical prism through
which to understand the balancing act that regulators perform when
seeking to oversee markets.1 6 2 When negotiating between the goals of
protecting financial market integrity, fostering innovation, and in
legislating through clear and simple rules, regulators can achieve only
two out of these three goals. This earlier work argued that the singular
characteristics of fintech complicate these already tough trade-offs.

Information asymmetries obscure an understanding of what kinds of
rules are needed to protect market integrity. New types of data can
lack informativeness. And perhaps most difficult of all, the changing
cast of regulated firms force regulators to really wrestle with the puzzle
of how to promote innovation by start-ups and fintech entrepreneurs
while maintaining market integrity through clear rulemaking.
International financial regulation further exacerbates these
difficulties and imports a novel dimension that heightens the barrier
to successful global standard setting. As argued here, information
asymmetries constitute a significant challenge to international
standard setting and enforcement, obscuring the risks to global market

integrity.

This

difficulty

is

amplified

by

the

need

to

craft

straightforward standards that can overcome differences in national
legal systems, markets, and administrative processes. The intensity of
this problem for global regulators is made more severe within a context
where the power to set the agenda is now shared between a more
heterogenous mix of economies. Greater diffusion of power brings new
and higher bargaining costs for decision-makers. With fintech playing
a more significant economic role in some economies relative to others,
future standard setting will have to account for the differences in how
fintech has impacted countries and regions distributively. Finally,
international regulation must account for divergences in national
market structures that vary in their embrace of fintech and the scale
of disintermediation underway within their economies. This reduces
the ability for international regulation to achieve rules clarity as
standards must be applicable to a more diverse set of national market
environments, each distinctive in its adoption of fintech products and
services.
To be sure, international technocratic bodies like the FSB, IOSCO,
and the Basel Committee have sought to engage on matters of
fintech. 1 63 They have pursued valuable research, offered guidance on

162. See generally Brummer & Yadav, supra note 6.
163. See, e g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices:
Implications of Fintech Developments for Banks and Bank Supervisors, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS
(Aug.
2017),
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d4l5.pdf
[https://permac/EG73-8DFS] (archived Feb. 7, 2020); FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 83,
at 3-7; Update to the Report on the IOSCOAutomated Advice Tools Survey: FinalReport,
supra note 89, at 3.
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new technologies, and suggested best practices. Nevertheless, despite
these efforts, successful standard setting remains a work-in-progress.
There may be some partial solutions. For example, instead of trying to
align all G-20 markets within a common set of standards, regulators
may try to pursue more "minilateral" approaches.' 6 4 In other words,
domestic regulators may seek out regional solutions to common risks.
Such a strategy might see countries within regional blocs, such as AsiaPacific, the EU, Africa, and the Americas, work together to craft
standards tailored to impact fintech within the region. Countries that
are geographically close may host a common set of firms providing
services across the region. For example, digital wallet providers may
be well placed to build infrastructure more easily across borders where
countries are proximate to one another. Algorithms may be easier to
adapt to countries whose close borders mean that programmers have
greater knowledge of local customs, financial habits, and market

participants. As a result, countries may be better placed to negotiate
with one another if they are already well used to doing so on matters
of regional interest. Nevertheless, such a solution remains a partial
one. For one, regional players can compete ruthlessly with one
another' 65 Fintech firms may wish to compete across multiple regions.
Minilateral rulemaking does not inoculate participating countries from
enacting rules that lack fullest information on new innovations or that
are insufficiently protective against risks that significant innovations
may create.
Regulators might also look to private firms to develop industry
standards as a form of self-regulation. Powerful players like Apple,
Facebook, Amazon, WeChat, Alibaba, and others might work to
develop common rules of the road. Such a solution could overcome some
information gaps by allowing the industry to harness its nativeexpertise. Further, it might reduce time and administrative resources
if firms themselves take the lead. However, while a helpful supplement
to public regulation, private action is unlikely to be fully successful as
a way of contracting around the difficulties of the Trilemma. Private
firms may be unwilling to share information about themselves and
their proprietary algorithms. They may be unwilling or unable to
acknowledge the risks they are likely to create, develop standards that
benefit themselves at the expense of competitors looking for a foothold,
or underestimate the costs of collective behaviors. These problems are
far from unprecedented: industry self-regulation of over-the-counter
derivatives markets, for example, offers a cautionary tale from the
recent past.

164. See BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM, supra note 24, at 17-21 (analyzing past
"minilaterlist" approaches in international financial regulations).
165. See Price, supra note 138 (discussing the intense competition between
regulators to cater in fintech in the Asia-Pacific region).

1146

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[voL 53:1109

Put simply, as fintech is fast becoming a part of mainstream

finance, regulators face the possibility of being caught on the back foot
once again. Where innovations might spread the risk of operational
failure, data loss, intrusive surveillance, or catastrophic defaults, the

damage is unlikely to respect borders or the nationality of the digital
consumers affected. As Facebook's attempt at creating Libra shows, it
is only a matter of time before regulators confront transnational
phenomena with ever greater frequency. Given the costs highlighted
in this Article, the question remains whether it will take another global

crisis for them to realize it.

